Oh Affy, it really was about the huile

This is from a 2005 academic paper:
Moving Beyond the Great Game: The Geoeconomics of Russia’s Influence in the Caspian Energy Bonanza.
Authors:Stulberg, Adam N.1 adam.stulberg@inta.gatech.edu
Source:Geopolitics; Spring2005, Vol. 10 Issue 1, p1-25, 25p

Control over the extraction and export of Caspian energy lies at the crux of
the competition for power and influence in Eurasia. Although far smaller
than the reserves of the Persian Gulf, the Caspian region is generally
expected to hold between 75 and 233 billion barrels of oil in onshore and
offshore fields, ranking it second worldwide in unproven oil reserves at the
Moving Beyond the Great Game 5
high end. In spite of drilling and logistical hurdles, as well as geological
unknowns, proven oil reserves range between 8 and 33 billion barrels of
oil. However, even conservative estimates project that output could rise to
3–4.7 million barrels per day (bpd) by 2010 (and roughly 6 million bpd by
2020), making the region an oil producing area roughly equivalent to the
United States and North Sea today. The Caspian Basin also is estimated to
contain up to 232 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of proven and as much as 293 Tcf
of probable natural gas reserves, equivalent to twice the combined total in
the United States and Mexico.10 Although Caspian energy reserves are
underdeveloped and ultimately not pivotal for global markets, they are
potentially critical on the margins for diversifying the international supply
base. Most of the extracted resources will be available for export due to the
small populations and relatively low consumption rates in the littoral states.
Accordingly, they can be decisive for alleviating pressures generated by
short-term bottlenecks in supply from other regions.11 Not surprisingly, control
over the division and transport of Caspian energy has animated intense
strategic and economic gamesmanship among outside states and global
energy firms, and has been integrally tied to the political stability and legitimacy
of regimes across Eurasia.12
Upon his election in March 2000, President Putin moved decisively to
put his stamp on Russia’s efforts to play in this game. As noted by others,
Putin’s ‘activist’ agenda constituted a break with the previous ad hoc, uncoordinated
and reactive strategy under Yeltsin, representing a substantively
new posture for reversing Russia’s near-decade retreat and advancing
national interests in the high-stakes competition for Caspian energy
resources and transportation.13 The most notable features of this strategy
included: the assertion of Russia’s unambiguous interests in competing for
economic and diplomatic influence in the Caspian Basin, as well as concerted
lobbying efforts aimed at gaining inclusion of Russian energy firms in
joint development projects and blocking several US-sponsored proposals for
trans-Caspian pipelines. As summed up by Douglas Blum, Putin’s approach
was ‘akin to the classic entrepreneurial image: energetically knocking on
doors, offering a better mousetrap, and getting a jump on the (American)
competition’.

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